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BANKS AND BANKING--CERTFICATES OF DEPOSrr-PAYMENT TO ALTERNATE
PAYEE AFTER DEATE OF DEPOSTo.-A deposited money with the defendant bank
and took a certificate of deposit to the effect that "A or B have deposited
$3,550.00 payable to either order six months after date." A died four months
later. At maturity the bank with knowledge of A's death paid B. A's adminis-
trator sued the bank to recover the amount so paid. Held, (one judge dissenting)
that the plaintiff could recover. Smith v. Planters' Savings Bank (1923, S. C.)
117 S. E. 312.
As between the alternate payees or their representatives, the prevailing rule
seems to be that a deposit by A to the account of A or B is not effective to
convey title to B without consideration, because it fails as a testamentary disposi-
tion for want of compliance with the statute of wills and as a gift inter vivos
because the depositor retains a power to withdraw it. Sawyer v. Mabus (917)
I07 S. C. 369, 92 S. E. 1029; (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 776. For the
variety of interpretations given to similar types of deposit, see Brady, Bank
Deposits (I911). The instant case is to be distinguished in two respects: it
concerns a certificate of deposit and not a simple account; and the defendant is
not the other payee but the bank. The majority of the court holds that in its
nature the certificate of deposit is a power of attorney from A to B, and is
revoked by the death of A. But it seems hard to regard a contract signed only
by the obligor as a contract of agency between the obligees. By the great weight
of authority, such a certificate of deposit as that in the instant case is a negotiable
promissory note, and may be 'made payable to alternate payees. I Williston,
Contracts (192o) 612; L. R. A. 1918 C, 691, note; N. I. L. sec. 8 (5). But even
under the minority rule that a certificate is only evidence of a contract of deposit,
the bank need not go behind the terms of the contract as dictated to it by the
depositor. The only notice to the bank beyond the written terms of the contract
is that A made the deposit in person, and this is clearly insufficient to prove A
the owner. It is equally conceivable that B has furnished a valuable considera-
tion or even that A deposited merely as his agent. If B in fact has no legal
rights against the administrator, the latter's remedy should be against B. Public
policy demands that banks be free to pay their debts promptly, provided they are
not in so doing guilty of negligence or the breach of an actual contract. Provi-
dence Assisting Association v. Citizens' Savings Bank (1895) ig R. I. 142, 32 Atl.
306; Cf. CoMMETS (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 242. The cases requiring the
bank to ascertain that payments are made to the proper person are cases in which
the account is payable to an administrator or guardian, and the duty is simply to
ascertain who is the true administrator or guardian. Wolfe v. Bank of Anderson
(1922, S. C.) x16 S. E. 451; McMahon v. German-Atmcrican National Bank
(191o) iii Minn. 313, 127 N. W. 7.
CAamRs-BLLS OF LADING-TRANSFER OF ORDER BLns AFTER DELIVERY OF
GooDs.-The defendant delivered goods but neglected to take up the order bills
of lading, which were later fraudulently altered in date from 199o to 191o and
transferred for value to the plaintiff. The alteration was obvious. The bills
included stipulations that their surrender should be required before delivery of the
goods, and that any alteration unauthorized by the carrier should be without effect
and the bills enforceable according to their original tenor. Delivery of the goods
without surrender of the bill was a crime by the carrier under N. Y. Penal
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Law, 19o9, sec. 365. The plaintiff sued the defendant carrier for the loss. Held,
(two judges dissenting) that the plaintiff could not recover. Saugerties Bank v.
Delaware & Hudson Co. (1923) 204 App. Div. 211, 198 N. Y. Supp. 722.
The variety of forms of bills of lading and of the laws applying to them in
different jurisdictions has been a source of great financial difficulty and loss.
Moulton, Financial Organization (1921) 396. The result has been a uniform bill
of lading, and uniform and federal statutes. The instant case interprets the
uniform bill of lading at common law. At common law an assignee, even of an
order bill, acquired no greater rights than his assignor, and the early statutes
aiming at negotiability were construed merely to confirm the power of assignment.
Shaw v. R. R. Co. (1879) 101 U. S. 557; but see H-iUtchings v. Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. (1911) 84 Kan. 479, 114 Pac. 1077. Therefore, no rights could be acquired
on a "spent" bill. National Comnercial Bank of Albany z. Lackawanna Trairs-
port Co. (igoi) 59 App. Div. 27o, 69 N. Y. Supp. 396, affirmed 172 N. Y. 596, 64
N. E. 1123. If the plaintiff acquired the bill before the goods were delivered by
the carrier, the result was the contrary. This has been explained on the ground
that the penal statute gives a private right to one injured. First National Bank v.
N. Y. Central R. R. Co. (1895, Sup. Ct.) 85 Hun, i6o, 32 N. Y. Supp. 6o4. Or
on the ground that the carrier is liable for conversion. Sheldon v. N. Y. Central
R. R. Co. (19o8, Sup. Ct.) 61 Misc. 274, 113 N. Y. Supp. 676. In the instant
case the minority invokes estoppel, which would be equally applicable to spent
bills. The doctrine has been applied to non-negotiable contracts. American
National Bank z. Somerville (1923, Calif.) 216 Pac. 376. And to stock certifi-
cates. McNeil z. Tenth National Bank (1871) 46 N. Y. 325. This last case
purports "to apply a general rule, applicable to property other than negotiable
securities," and there are further dicta favoring its application to bills of lading.
See Shaw v. R. R. Co., supra, at p. 561; Friedlander v. Texas Ry. (1888) 130
U. S. 416, 424, 9 Sup. Ct. 570, 572. This is in accord with the purpose of the
uniform bill of lading and modern statutes to protect banks which advance against
bills. Matter of Bills of Lading (19o8) 14 I. C. C. Rep. 346, 348; Act of
August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 538, sec. ii) ; Uniform Bills of Lading Act, sec. 14.
It seems that the policy of the statutes should apply at common law, whenever
estoppel may be invoked. It is difficult to perceive what other purpose the surren-
der clause may have. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff was put on notice
of the alteration. The minority answers that this is immaterial under the stipula-
tion that an altered bill is to be enforced according to its original tenor. This
stipulation is incorporated in the new statutes. It seems to have been conceived
with specific reference to alterations before delivery of the goods, in which case
no hardship is imposed on the carrier by requiring him to fulfill his original
obligation. Commissioners' Note to Uniform Act, sec. 16; 39 Stat. at L. 538, sec.
13. But neither estoppel nor negotiability protects one relying even without notice
on the appearances created by an intervening alteration of a completed instrument.
Cf. N. I. L. sec. 124. And there is ground for the contention that the plaintiff
in the instant case took a bill so out of date under its original and only effective
tenor, as to be out of the course of business practice and thus to make its reliance
unreasonable. A like result might be obtained under the good faith clause in the
recent statutes. Uniform Act, sec. 14; 39 Stat. at L. 538, sec. ii.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION-HOUSING EmERGENCY
LAws.-On the report of legislative committees that a housing emergency existed
throughout the state, the New York legislature passed statutes commonly known
as the September Housing Laws, to relieve the situation. One of these statutes
empowered the legislative body of any city or county to exempt from taxation
for local purposes for a period of ten years, new buildings planned for dwelling
purposes. N. Y. La*s, 1922, ch. 281. An action was brought to determine the
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constitutionality of this statute. Held, that it was constitutional. Hermitage 
v.
Goldfogle (1923, N. Y.) 204 App. Div. 710.
The power to determine what property shall be taxed implies 
a power to
prescribe what property shall not be taxed. Baker v. West Hartford (1915) 89
Conn. 394, 94 At1. 283. Furthermore, the power to exempt falls 
within the
legislative power to classify for taxation. See American Sugar Refining Co. v.
Louisiana (igoo) 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43; I Cooley, Taxation (3d ed. 1903)
343; see also Hall, Cases on Constitutional Law (1913) 617, note 
(cases cited).
Hence, unless restrained by constitutional provisions, the legislature 
has power
to exempt from taxation any person or class of property according 
to its views
of public policy or expediency. Laurence University v. Ontagamic County 
(1912)
15o Wis. 244, 136 N. W. 619; Gibbons v. District of Columbia (1886) 116 U. 
S.
4o4, 6 Sup. Ct. 427. Thus, exemptions from property taxation 
of charitable and
educational institutions are valid. State v. Carleton College (1922, Minn.) 191
N. W. 400; see NOTES (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 733. Similarly a limited exemp-
tion to ex-soldiers from property taxes. Mechanic Falls v. Millet (1922, Me.)
117 Atl. 93. Or exemptions as a means of encouraging industry. 
Opinion of the
Court (1879) 58 N. H. 623; cf. Florida Central Ry. v. Reynolds (I9O2) i8s
U. S. 471, 22 Sup. Ct. 176. The presumption is that any particular classi-
fication or exemption is a valid means of effectuating the purpose of the legisla-
ture. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews (1898) 174 U. S. 96, i Sup. Ct. 6og;
Beach v. Bradstreet (1912) 85 Conn. 344, 82 AtI. 103o. New Jersey recently
held a statute similar to the one in the instant case unconstitutional. Braunstein
v. Jersey City (1923, N. J.) 12o At1. i. The New York court distinguishes this
case in that the New Jersey constitution, as opposed to its own, contains a pro-
vision that "property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws and by
uniform rules according to its true value." But even under such a provision the
legislature may exempt various classes of property. Harrison County v. Military
Academy (1921) 126 Miss. 729, 89 So. 617; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
(7th ed. 1903) 738. In the instant case the court suggested that this statute
is not nearly as drastic as the emergency rent regulation statute which had been
upheld. Marcus Brown'Holding Co. v. Feldman (1921) 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup.
Ct. 465; COMMENTS (i92i) 9 CALIF. L. REv. 337; see also Bloch v. Hirsh (1921)
256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458; (1922) 5 MINN. L. REv. 472. If the police power
of a state in an emergency is broad enough to' include rent regulation despite a
constitutional provision against impairment of contracts, and the due process
clause, a tax exemption-for new buildings in a like emergency should also be
upheld even where uniformity and equality are required. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, loc. cit.; see Wickersham, The Police Power and the New York
Emergency Rent Laws (1921) 69 U. PA. L. REv. 301. The instant case has been
recently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hermitage v. Goldfogle (1923)
236 N. Y. 52.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-INJuNcTION AGAINST FOREIGN
SUIT-An Iowa court issued an injunction permanently restraining the defendant
from suing the plaintiff in the State of Minnesota for an injury received in
Iowa throught the latter's negligence. The defendant commenced an action
against the plaintiff in Minnesota. The plaintiff then sued for an injunction in
Minnesota, relying on the Iowa decree. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the
Minnesota action was not barred by the Iowa decree. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Rule
(1923, Minn.) 193 N. W. 161.
Equity generally has jurisdiction to restrain the bringing of foreign suits.
Lord Portarlington v. Soulby (1834, Ch.) 3 Myl. & K. 1O4; Wabash Ry. Co. v.
Peterson (igi) 187 Iowa, 1331, 175 N. W. 523. The decree is directed against
the person, not against the courts of a sister state. Jones v. Hughes (1912) 156
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Iowa, 684, 137 N. W. 1O23; (i92o) 5 IOwA L. BULL. 27I. Such a decree does not
deny any privilege or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution. Cole v. Cunning-
ham (1889) 133 U. S. 107, io Sup. Ct. 26.9. There is some confusion as to the
kind of equitable decree entitled to full faith and credit. A decree ordering
the payment of a specific sum of money must be given full faith and credit.
Barber v. Barber (1858, U. S.) 21 How. 582; Lynde v. Lynde (1goi) 181 U. S.
183, 21 Sup. Ct. 555. But not a decree for future payments, if the court render-
ing the decree has power to revoke or alter it. Cf. Sistare v. Sistare (igog)
218 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct. 682. A decree adjudicating fraud in the procurement of
a judgment must be held under the full faith and credit clause conclusive evidence
of such fraud in another state. Dobson v. Pearce (1854) 12 N. Y. 156. A
decree adjudicating an antecedent obligation which is conclusive in the jurisdic-
tion where rendered is likewise conclusive on the merits elsewhere. So when a
decree of specific performance for the conveyance of land is alleged as the foun-
dation of an action at the situs it must be given full faith and credit. Burnley v.
Stevenson (1873) 24 Ohio St 474; COMMENTS (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
311; Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree (igig) 17
MIcH. L. REV. 527. And a decree for the conveyance of foreign land on the
settlement of a partnership has been held conclusive by the situs without refer-
ence to the full faith and credit clause. Dunlap v. Byers (1896) IIo Mich. log,
67 N. W. io67. It has often been asserted that equitable decrees for the con-
veyance of land in other states are not enforceable. Bullock v. Bullock (1894)
52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676; Fall v. Eastin (19o) 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3;
contra: Mallette v. Carpenter (1916) 164 Wis. 415, 16o N. W. 182. But these
cases are distinguishable inasmuch as the courts had not the obligor, but only
his transferees before them. A decree of divorce seems to stand on special
footing and need be given full faith and credit only when rendered by the state
of the matrimonial domicile if the plaintiff is domiciled within the state. Ather-
ton v. Atherton (i9ox) 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544; Haddock v. Haddock
(19o6) 2oi U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct 525; I Schofield, Constitutional Law and Equity
(1921) 153. In the instant case the Iowa injunction may be said to represent
the adjudication of plaintiff's "equitable right" not to be sued in a Minnesota
court. While this would not create a duty of enforcement by process on the
Minnesota court, it seems that under the full faith and credit clause it should
be conclusive of the question at issue. The United States Supreme Court has
not yet spoken on the subject.
CoNsarnunioNAL LAw-SEPARATIOx OF PowERs-PowER To ATToRNEY GENERAL
TO ISSUE SUBlPOENAS UNCONSTITUTiONAL.-A New York statute authorized the
Attorney General, when directed by the Governor, to inquire into matters con-
cerning the public peace, safety, and justice, -and empowered him to subpoena
witnesses, examine them under oath, and require the production of material
documents. N. Y. Cons. Laws, r9og, ch. 23, sec. 62 (8). The Attorney General
subpoenaed officers of a telegraph company to deliver to him cablegrams sent by
one Ward, indicted for murder. The Ward Baking Co., an interested party,
sought ap injunction to restrain such delivery. Held, reversing an order deny-
ing plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction, that if the purpose of the
statute was to authorize a criminal investigation by the Attorney General, with
power to subpoena, it was unconstitutional, as usurping the power of the judiciary.
Ward Baking Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1923) 205 App. Div. 725,
2oo N. Y. Supp. 865.
The doctrine of the separation of powers is not susceptible of rigorous applica-
tion. It is essential, however, that the group exercising the whole power of
any one department shall not control the whole power of either of the other
departments. Story, The Constitution (sth ed. 1891) 393. The modern tendency
RECENT CASE' NOTES
is toward increasing correlation of the departments of government. See Green,
Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YALE LAw JOuRNAL, 369, 391.
The grand jury fulfills a governmental and not a judicial function in investigating
crime and presenting offenders. State, ex rel. Doerfler, v. Price (i92o) OI
Ohio St. 5o, 128 N. E. 173. The Attorney General, supplanting the prosecuting
officer in a proper case, may attend its proceedings and examine witnesses. See
Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky (i92i) 238 Mass. 379, 131 N. E. 207; State, ex
rel. Miller, v. District Court (igio) ig N. D. 81g, 124 N. W. 417. And it is
held that when making his own investigations, as directed by the Governor, he
may subpoena witnesses. State, ex rel. Stubbs, v. Dawson (i911) 86 Kan. i8o,
119 Pac. 360. He may administer oaths to those summoned and take their testi-
mony. State, ex rel. Stubbs, v. Dawson, supra; Kan. Gen. Sts. '1915, sec. 5503.
Investigation of crime is accelerated by the Attorney General's assumption of
this branch of the grand jury's work, for his established department can operate
more efficiently than a temporary body. The customary method of determining
whether the executive is infringing on the judiciary is by ascertaining whether
it is attempting to adjudicate the rights of individuals. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations (7th ed. 1903) 132; The Queen v. Local Government Board [19o2,
K. B.] 2 Ir. L. 349, 373. Judicial power is not usurped by authorizing non-
judicial officers to investigate complaints concerning civil service officers, to
subpoena witnesses and papers, administer oaths, and take testimony, where no
judgment is authorized. People v. Kipley (1897) 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229. As
no power to determine rights were granted to the Attorney General in the instant
case it seems that the court might properly have held the statute constitutional.
CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCIioN-AGEEMENTS To AGREE.-The defendant contracted
to sell i6,ooo tons of paper to the plaintiff, to be shipped at the rate of i,ooo tons
a month. The prices for the first four months were fixed by the contract, which
also provided that "for the balance of the period of this agreement, the price
of the paper and length of terms for which such price shall apply shall be agreed
upon .... said price in no event to be higher than the contract price charged
by the Canadian Export Company to large consumers." At the end of four
months, the defendant refused to negotiate a price and refused the plaintiff's
monthly demands for shipment in accordance with the price fixed by the Cana-
dian Export Company. The defendant demurred to a complaint setting forth
these facts. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the demurrer should be sustained.
Sun Printing & Publishing Assoc. v. Remington Paper Power Co. (1923) 235
N. Y. 338.
An agreement to enter into a contract in the future the terms of which are
definite and certain is binding. Pratt v. Hudson River Ry. (i86o) 21 N. Y. 305;
Young v. Lanyon (1922, Mo. App.) 242 S. W. 685. The same is true if the
agreement to agree relates to some incidental or subsidiary term of the contract.
Howison v. Bartlett (19o6) 147 Ala. 408, 40 So. 757. When the intent to make
a presently binding agreement is clear, the courts will construe the contract as
calling for a reasonable time or price where there is a failure to agree. Ramot
v. Schotenfels (1863) 15 Iowa, 457; Page v. Cook (1895) 164 Mass. In6, 41
N. E. I15; Spiritusfabrieck Astra v. Sugar Products Co. (1917) 176 App. Div.
829, 163 N. Y. Supp. 516; see Noble v. Burnett Co. (ig1) 2o8 Mass. 75, 94
N. E. 289. The same rule has been applied especially to contracts between
municipalities and public utility corporations. Joy v. St. Louis (89o) 138 U. S.
1, I1 Sup. Ct. 243; Slade v. Lexington (gio) 41 Ky. 214, 132 S. W. 404
(agreements for renewal with terms to be agreed upon); contra: Livingston
Waterworks v. Livingston (1916) 53 Mont I, 162 Pac. 381. But agreements
to negotiate merely are inoperative, as there is no duty to agree. Shepard
v. Carpenter (1893) 54 Minn. 153, 55 N. W. 9o6; Mayer v. McCreery (189o)
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11g N. Y. 434, 23 N. E. 1045; cf. Dayton v. Stone (i896) III Mich. 196,
69 N. W. 515; but see Watts v. Weston (1894, C. C. A. 2d) 62 Fed. 136
(nominal damages allowed). And performance under the contract subsequent
. to disagreement creates a quasi-contractual duty to pay a reasonable price.
Domhoff & Joyce v. Hamilton Furnace Co. (1923, Ohio) 14o N. E. 485. Often,
in the case of a binding option, one of the parties is for a good consideration
given an irrevocable power to fix certain terms in the future. Vickery v. Maier
(1912) 164 Calif. 384, 129 Pac. 273. Such a power must be exercised strictly
within the limits set. Winders v. Kenan (1913) I61 N. C. 628, 77 S. E. 687.
And a promise to perform a fixed and unconditional part of the agreement is a
good consideration for the option as to the remaining part. Koehler Mercantile
Co. v. Ill. Glass Co. (1919) 143 Minn. 344, 173 N. W. 703. Where a lessee is
given an option to purchase a't a price not to exceed a given fixed amount, the
lessee has a power to purchase at the maximum price named. Heyward v. Will-
tmarth (1903) 87 App. Div. 125, 84 N. Y. Supp. 75. In the instant case it is
difficult to find an intent to give the buyer an option. But the intent to make a
binding agreement for the sale of 16,ooo tons of paper seems clear. Since ship-
ments and payments were to be monthly, it seems that the adoption of the
maximum price charged by the Canadian Export Company during the month of
shipment offered a reasonable basis for giving operative effect to that intent.
Nor does any substantial reason appear for the court to refuse to apply to the
determination of the period over which a price is to operate the rule of reason-
ableness which is regularly applied to fix prices or times for delivery.
CRIMINAL LAw-ORATOR URGING ACTS OF VIOLENcE GUILTY OF SOLICITATION.-
The defendant addressed an assemblage of striking workmen and urged them to
cofnmit acts of violence constituting felonies and misdemeanors. He was charged
with the common law crime of solicitation. The trial court quashed the informa-
tion. The state appealed. Held, that the information should be sustained. State
v. Schleifer (1923, Conn.) 121 Atl. 8o5.
The contention that solicitation is not a crime distinct from a criminal attempt
is squarely met and disapproved by the court. The weight of reason as of
authority is in accord. State v. Harney (I8go) iol MO. 470, 14 S. W. 657; Exparte
Floyd (19o8) 7 Calif. App. 588, 95 Pac. I75; (0914) 14 COL. L. REv. 68I; contra:
State v. George (1914) 79 Wash. 262, 140 Pac. 337; 1 Bishop, New Criminal Law
(8th ed. 1892) sec. 767. The court also rejected the contention that a solicitation
must be addressed to a particular individual. What little authority there is
supports this view. Regina v. Most (x88i, Ct. Crim. App.) 14 Cox C. C. 583;
United States v. Galleanni (1917, D. Mass.) 245 Fed. 977. The opinion makes a
novel delimitation of the crime of solicitation, making the test whether an attempt
to commit the crime advised would be a crime. This conclusion is based on the
current formula that solicitation is a crime if the crime advised seriously affects
the public peace and economy. Rex v. Higgins (i8oi, K. B.) 2 East, 5 (embezzle-
ment) ; Comotwnwealth v. Flagg (1883) 135 Mass. 545 (arson) ; State v. Sullivan
(19o4) iio Mo. App. 75, 84 S. W. 1o5 (bribery); Brill, Cyclopedia of Criminal
Law (1922) sec. 158. There is another view that only solicitations to crimes
which lead to breaches of the public peace or interferences with public justice are
crimes. Wharton, Criminal Law (9th ed. 1885) sec. 179; State v. Baller (1885)
26 W. Va. 90 (procuring a witness to absent himself) ; Cox v. People (1876) 82
Ill. 191 (solicitation to incest). Some courts have limited the offense to solicita-
tions to felonies. Smith v. Commonwealth (1868) 54 Pa. 209 (adultery) ; Lamb
v. State (i889) 67 Md. 524, io At. 2o8 (abortion). A further delimitation, not
mentioned in the case, is that the language complained of shall not be constitution-
ally privileged. Words have been said not to be indictable unless they create a
clear and present danger of commission of crime. United States v. Schenk (igig)
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249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247; United States v. Abrans (ig) 250 U. S. 616, 40
Sup. Ct. 17; COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337. But this test seems
applicable only to public addresses or writings. Cf. State v. Sullivan, supra
(bribery) ; State v. Avery (i86o) 7 Conn. 266 (adultery). Also it seems that
the persons who are to be the objects of the crime must be capable of identification
from the language and circumstances. I Wharton, Criminal Law (ilth ed. 1912)
sec. 218. Following the decision of the lower court a drastic statute was passed
making criminal any advocation, encouragement or justification of public or
private injury to persons or property. Conn. Pub. Laws, 1923, ch. 178. For
similar statutes see N. J. Pub. Laws, 198o, 577; Calif. Sts. I919, ch. 188.
MANDAMUS-ILLEGAL DISMISSAL FROM PUBLIC OFFICE-EXERCISE OF DIscRE-
TioN.-The relator, a city councilman, procured a police sergeant to buy liquor for
him and later recommended to the council that this same sergeant be appointed
chief of police. The council dismissed the relator and declared his office vacant.
The city charter provided that no councilman be dismissed except upon conviction
of malfeasance in office or some infamous crime. The relator sought a writ of
mandamus to be re-instated. The lower court issued the mandamus and the state
appealed. B-eld, (two judges dissenting) that the relator was not entitled to a
mandamus. State, ex rel. White, v. Mills (1923, Conn.) 121 At. 561..
Although the writ of mandamus was originally a prerogative writ issued at the
discretion of the king, with the enactment of the Common Law Procedure Act
the jurisdiction was extended to the superior courts of England. Bagg's Case
(1616, K. B.) ii Co. Rep. 93 b; Jenks, Prerogative Writs in English Law
(923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 523, 529; 58 L. R. A. 833, note. In this country
the writ has entirely lost its prerogative characteristics and is strictly an action at
law. Gilnan v. Bassett (1866) 33 Cvnn. 298; Moody v. Fleming (1848) 4 Ga.
115, 119. It lies to re-instate in office one who has been illegally ousted. Rex v.
Barker (1762, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1265; Thompson v. Troup (igoi) 74 Conn. 121,
49 At. 9o7. Where, however, there is a successor holding office under color of
title, quo warranto is the appropriate remedy. Duane v. McDonwld (1874) 41
Conn. 517. The writ will not lie if the relator is guilty of laches. State v. Pater-
son, Newark & N. Y. Ry. (1881) 43 N. J. L. 505. Or if the mandamus in a
proper case would be of no avail. Conmonwealth v. Anthony (1842, Pa.) 4 Watts
& S. 5ii. It is said the writ is unavailable if there is another adequate or easily
obtainable remedy. State, ex rel. Reed, v. Board of Education (1898) ioo Wis.
455, 76 N. W. 351; Bonner v. State, ex. rel. Pitts(1849) 7 Ga. 473. But this
qualification does not apply where the other remedy is equitable. Baltinre Uni-
versity v. Colton (i9o4) 98 Md. 623, 57 AtL 14. It is frequently stated that in all
cases the writ of mandamus is discretionary and this is the basis of the decision in
the principal case. But the cases generally cited for this proposition are those
where the relator's legal right is in doubt or where the writ would be of no
avail. See Woodbury v. County Commissioners (1855) 4o Me. 304 (term of office
already expired); Rex v. Mayor of Bristol (1822, K. B.) I Dowl. & Ryl. 389
(relator's right not proven). As is pointed out in the dissenting opinion of the
principal case, no case has been found where the writ was refused when the
relator had a clear legal right. In the principal case the relator's legal right not
to be removed from office except in the prescribed manner was invaded. A writ
of mandamus being denied, and no other remedy being available, we have the
peculiar case of a right without a remedy. The dissenting judges seem, therefore,
correct in arguing that the court should have no discretion to refuse to issue the
writ.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONTRACTS-STATUTORY LiMiiATiON ON ExpEmmI-
TUREs-EMPLOYMENT OF EMERGENCY POLICE.-The Mayor of a city engaged extra
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policemen during a strike, pursuant to an Act authorizing him to do so in time of
emergency. At the request of the Mayor, who promised that the city would
repay the money if it could legally do so, the bank met the payroll of the addi-
tional policemen. Ohio Gen. Code, i921, see. 38o6 provided that no contract
involving the expenditure of money should be made by a municipal officer unless
a certificate had been obtained from a city auditor that the money was in the
treasury to the credit of the fund from which it was to be withdrawn. No
certificate had been obtained. The bank brought an action against the city for
the sums advanced. Held, that the provision of the General Code was inapplica-
ble and the plaintiff could recover. City of Youngstown. v. First National Bank
of Youngstown (1922, Ohio) 14o N. E. 176.
Statutes generally deny municipalities the power to incur a contractual obliga-
tion before an appropriation has been made to meet it. Occasionally such
statutes, as in the principal case, require that a certificate that the money has
been appropriated be obtained. These restrictions are often included in the
corporation charter. The statutes are mandatory when applicable; and con-
tracts made without .compliance are void. 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations
(5th ed. 1911) sec. 790; Smith Canal Co. v. Denver (1894) 20 Colo. 84, 36 Pac.
844 (unenforceable against city) ; Hinkle v. Philadelphia (i9o6) 214 Pa. 126, 63
At. 590 (unenforceable against contractor). Nor are they subject to ratifica-
tion by a later appropriation. Indianapolis v. Wann (1896) 144 Ind. 175, 42
N. E. 9Ol. But in some cases where the city has received a benefit from the
performance a recovery is allowed in quasi-contract. See (1922) 31 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 779; (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 439. The applicability of these statutes
varies with circumstances. They seem designed to set limits to the possible
waste, extravagance or corruption of any single administration by cutting down
the available assets. Action involving foreseeable expenditure can therefore
properly be held within the statute. Thus the provision has been applied with
some reason to the compromise of a claim against the city for property damage
due to street improvements. Green v. Everett (19Ol) 179 Mass. 147, 6o N. E.
490. Contracts for supplies or services over a period of years are subject to
the statute. Smith Canal Co. v. Denver, supra (water supply); Toomey v.
Bridgeport (i9o6) 79 Conn. 229, 64 At. 215 (garbage removal). In such a case
the appropriation need be only for the amount to become due within the year,
and failure to make an appropriation in any future year seems to end the
contract, leaving no right of action against the city. See Toomey v. Bridgeport,
supra. The statute does not apply where the funds for payment are to be
derived from sources other than taxes. Kerr v. Bellefontaine (1898) 59 Ohio
St 446, 52 N. E. 1O24 (maintaining city gas-works from profits). Nor where a
later statute authorizes an expenditure, without mentioning the restrictive pro-
vision. Cincinnati v. Holmes (1897) 56 Ohio St. 1o4, 46 N. E. 514; cf. United
States v. New Orleans (1878) 98 U. S. 381. In such cases, from their nature,
there are other equally effective checks on the city administration. On principle
it seems that unforeseeable liability, occasioned by an emergency which threatens
the course of government, is not within the purpose of the statute. Since the
preservation of the peace was here deemed endangered, the court's decision hold-
ing the contracts with the emergency police valid and that the bank was subro-
gated to these contract rights, is in accord with the tendency to construe these
statutes with latitude to effect their purpose.
PROPERTY-FIXTURES-RIGHT OF DiSSEISOR IN IMPROVEMENTs.-The defendant,
pending condemnation proceedings in its behalf, entered upon the plaintiff's
land and made improvements. The condemnation statute was subsequently
declared unconstitutional. After bringing an action of ejectment the plaintiff
sued to recover mesne profits, and also the value of the improvements which the
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defendant had removed. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Titus v. Poland
Coal Co. (1923, Pa.) 1I9 At. 54 o .
When the question of the right to improvements on land arises between
grantor and grantee or landlord and tenant, the right to the improvements
depends upon the contract. O'Neal v. Quilter (1921) III Tex. 345, 234 S. W.
528; Reeder v. Smith (1922) 118 Wash. 505, 203 Pac. 95'; see Ewell, Fixtures
(1876) 76. But when made by a trespasser they usually pass to the owner of
the realty by the mere fact of annexation. Perley v. City of Cambridge (1915)
22o Mass. 507, io8 N. E. 494; Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) sec. 270.
The same rule applies where the trespasser acted under an innocent mistake.
Honzik v. Delaglise (I886) 65 Wis. 494, 27 N. W. 171; see Dutton v. Ensley
(1898) 21 Ind. App. 46, 5i N. E. 380; contra: Oftsley v. Lambeth (1917, Mo.
App.) 199 S. W. 594; see (I918) 18 COL. L. REv. 367. And it is immaterial
that the trespasser is also a disseisor. Doscher v. Blackiston (1879) 7 Or. 143;
Huebschmann v. McHenry (1872) 29 Wis. 655; see (1907) 7 CoL. L. REv. 22.
But where the owner of land seeks to recover mesne profits in equity he must
make allowance for improvements made by a disseisor under a bona fide claim
of title. Wakefield v. Van Tassell (i9o5) 218 Ill. 572, 75 N. E. 1O58. The same
principle has frequently been applied by courts of law. Ege v. Kille (1877) 84
Pa. 333; Sires v. Clark (1908) 132 Mo. App. 537, 112 S. W. 526. In most states
"Occupying Claimants' Acts" give the bona fide disseisor compensation for
improvements. Thompson v. Illinois Cent. Ry. (192o, Ind. App.) 129 N. E. 55;
Wakefield v. Van Tassell, supra; Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 274. The decision may
be justified since the defendant was not in the position of an innocent disseisor,
because he knew the validity of the statute was disputed. See Welles v. Newsom
(888) 76 Iowa, 81, 40 N. W. 105.
QUAsi-CoNTRACTS-BREACH OF CONTRACT BY PLAINTIFF-RECOVERY ALLOWED
WHERE DEFENDANT UNABLE TO PERFORm.-The defendant contracted to manu-
facture and deliver fifty million bullets in weekly installments to the plaintiff.
The contract provided that in case of default by the defendant, the plaintiff
might carry out the contract by manufacturing the bullets itself. After accepting
with protest a number of deliveries amounting to only six per cent of the deliv-
eries due, the plaintiff repudiated the contract and sued to recover for money
and materials advanced. The defendant counterclaimed for damages. The court
found that defendant was and for a reasonable time thereafter would be unable
to perform the contract according to its terms. Held, that since the defendant
could not take advantage of the plaintiff's breach without showing ability to
perform, a judgment for the plaintiff should be affirmed. Remington Arms Co.,
Inc. v. Gaynor Mfg. Co. (1923) 98 Conn. 721, 12o Ati. 572.
Where one party fails to perform his contract, the other may rescind and
recover in quasi-contract for money and materials advanced. See Keener, Quasi-
Contracts (1893) 292. The parties may, however, provide for a sole remedy in
case of breach. But unless the intention be clear to make a given special remedy
exclusive, it will be construed as cumulative and permissive. Mayfield v. Richard-
son Co. (1921) 2o8 Mo. App. 206, 231 S. W. 288; Feeney & Bremer Co. v. Stone
(1918) 89 Or. 360, 171 Pac. 569. The court in the instant case properly held the
remedy permissive. But acquiescence by the plaintiff in the continued defective
performance generally deprives him of the privilege to rescind without first giving
reasonable notice that strict performance will be insisted on. Henderson Tire &
Rubber Co. v. P. K. Wilson & Son (1923) 235 N. Y. 489; Vosburg v. Southern
Lumber & Mfg. Co. (1923, Tenn.) 251 S. W. 41; 2 Black, Rescission and Can-
cellation (1916) see. 604. It seems that the plaintiff had himself broken the
contract by repudiating without notice, and could not have recovered for advances
if the defendant had been ready and able to perform. See Ketchum v. Evertson
IOI
YALE LAW JOURNAL
(1816, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 13 Johns. 359; Foss-Hughes Co. v.. Norman (1923,
Del.) iig Atl. 854; contra: Britton v. Turner (1834) 6 N. H. 481; see also
4 Am. Dec. 657, notes. Contra, if the defendant's performance has become
impossible. McCormick v. Tappendorf (9o9) 51 Wash. 312, 99 Pac. 2. Or
where there is a high degree of inability even though it amounts to less than
total impossibility. Strasbourger v. Leerburger (1922) 233 N. Y. 55, 134 N. E.
834; see (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 91; I Black, op. cit. supra, sec. 207;
2 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 88o. The instant case is to be supported on
the ground that the defendant's inability to continue performance relieves the
plaintiff of his duty to perform, giving him on the other hand a power to repudi-
ate and a right to recover any advances in quasi-contract. Even to hold the plain-
tiff in default should not prevent a recovery where the default of the defen-
dant is equally as great. The court also bases the plaintiff's right on a mutual
rescission. But this reasoning seems doubtful on the facts, particularly since the
defendant by its counterclaim claims under the contract. See Merrill v. Merrill
(1894) 103 Calif. 287, 35 Pac. 768; Wainwright v. Weske (I889) 82 Calif. 193,
23 Pac. 12.
SURETYSHIP-RELEASE OF SURETY-FALURE OF CREDITOR TO REcoRD DEED OF
TRUST.-The defendant was surety on a note held by the plaintiff, secured by a
deed of trust which remained unrecorded. A second deed of trust was given by
the principal debtor to another creditor, who upon default, foreclosed. The note
was not paid. The defendant claimed to have been released by the negligence of
the plaintiff in failing to record the deed. Held, that the refusal of the lower
court to give a peremptory instruction was error, and that mere inaction of the
plaintiff did not release the surety. Bank of Hickory Flat v. Crawford (1923,
Miss.) 96 So. IOO.
Delay by the creditor in proceeding against the principal debtor after default
does not release the surety. Clopton v. Spratt (1876) 52 Miss. 251; Arnett v.
Simllpson (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. -W. 982. But in some states notice to'the
creditor to sue will effect such release unless prompt suit follows. Pan v. Packard
(1816, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 13 Johns. 174; Tex. Sts. 192o, arts. 6332, 6337; Spencer,
Suretyship (1913) 24o. The release of any or all of the security will operate as a
discharge of the surety pro tanto, even though.the surety was ignorant of its
existence. Richards v. Commonwealth (i86i) 40 Pa. 146; Day v. McPhee (1907)
41 Colo. 467, 93 Pac. 67o; Hubbard v. Hubbard (1911) 161 Ill. App. 623. But
the creditor need not obtain security nor actually enforce it if procured. Campbell
v. Sherman (1892) 151 Pa. 70, 25 Atl. 35 (failure to revive judgment) ; Phil-
brooks v. McEwen (1868) 29 Ind. 347 (failure to foreclose mortgage) ; 31 Am.
St. Rep. 737, note. But by the better view, impairment of the security will
discharge the surety to the extent of his actual damage. City Bank v. Young
(1862) 43 N. H. 457 (careless sale of mortgaged property); contra: Philbrooks
v. McEwen, supra. Failure to perfect the security has a like result. Southern
Trust Co. v. Vaughn, (1921, C. C. A. 8th) 277 Fed. 145 (failure to record mort-
gage) ; Redlon v. Heath (1898) 59 Kan. 255, 52 Pac. 862 (same) ; Nunn, v. Smith
(1917, Tex. Civ. App.) 194 S. W. 4o6 (same); contra: Westchester Mortgage
Co. v. Mclntire (1916) 174 App. Div. 525, r61 N. Y. Supp. 39o (failure to file
assignment in compliance with statute). To allow the security to lapse discharges
in the same way. Fennell r,. McGowan, (188o) 58 Miss. 261 (security barred by
the Statute of Limitations before maturity of the debt secured) ; First National
Bank v. Parsons (1896) 42 W. Va. 137, 24 S. E. 554 (failure to file judgment
lien) ; 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 71o, note. In a few states failure to perfect the
security will entirely release the surety. Bledsoe v. Ivey (1921) 27 Ga. App. 235,
1O7 S. E. 615 (failure to record instrument of title). The creditor's duty ceases,
however, where the surety can, by paying the debt, himself make the security
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available. Clopton v. Spratt, supra; Arnett v. Simpson, supra. For upon pay-
ment of the debt the surety acquires the right to the full benefit of all the
collateral security. Schroeppel v. Shaw (1850) 3 N. Y. 446; Wills v. Fuller
(1915) 47 Okla. 720, 15o Pac. 693. Or upon tender. Bankers' Surety Co. v.
Linder (1912) 156 Iowa, 486, 137 N. W. 496. The instant case is unsound in
failing to distinguish between delay in the enforcement of the debt when due, and
inaction which resulting in loss of the security should release the surety pro tanto.
TAXATION-CNsTITuTIONAL LAW--GADUATED INIHERITAN CE TAX A TAX ON
PR OPERT.-The House of Representatives requested the Justices to determine thie
validity of proposed legislation imposing a graduated tax upon property to which
collateral descendants succeeded. The State Constitution provided that "the
charges of government may be raised by taxation upon estates .... and property
when passing by will or inheritance." N. H. Const. Amend. 19o2, Part II, art. 6.
Held, that the proposed tax was a property tax and unconstitutional for lack of
uniformity. In re Opinions of the Justices (1923, N. H.) 12o Atl. 629.
The general view is that succession is enjoyed only by virtue of a "privilege"
granted by the state. Eyre v. Jacob (1858, Va.) I4 Gratt. 422; Magoun v.
Illinwis Tru-st & Savings Bank (1898) 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594; In re
Martin's Estate (1923, Vt.) 12o Atl. 862; see Stone v. Elliott (1914) 182 Ind. 454,
io6 N. E. 71o; but see Nunnenracher v. State (19o6) 129 Wis. 19o, io8 N. W.
627 (state cannot appropriate entire estate of the deceased). Succession taxes,
being thus upon the exercise of a privilege, are not subject to the restrictions
placed upon so-called property taxes and may therefore be graduated. State v.
Handlin (1911) ioo Ark. 175, 139 S. W. 1112. The practical effect of progressive
rates is to prevent the overtaxing of the needy and the undertaxing of the
prosperous. The court in the instant case reaches the unusual result by viewing
the proposed tax as a tax upon "property when passing," and therefore as a
property tax. Courts have construed the term "property" to refer to the physical
thing and have intended that meaning in the term "property tax." Cf. Hart v. Smith
(1902) 159 Ind. 182, 64 N. E. 661. More accurately the term refers only to the
legal relations which a person has with respect to the physical thing. Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 16, 21. Any tax
on "property," whether it be called an excise or property tax, is in essence a tax
on what is equally a "privilege": the privilege granted by the state of enjoying
such legal relations. Such an analysis in no way renders impossible or less
practically sound the established historical distinction in taxation between the
normal and ordinary property relations incident to mere holding and such an
abnormal or unusual relation as the privilege of acquisition by inheritance. The
effect of this decision is to render invalid N. H. Laws, 1919, ch. 37, creating a
progressive tax on lineals, which as the court says, has apparently not been
questioned. The opinion does not overrule but seems contrary to Thompson v.
Kidder (i9o6) 74 N. H. 8g, 65 Atl. 392, upholding an inheritance tax lacking
uniformity because of its exemption features. By its failure properly to analyze
the meaning of terms, the New Hampshire court has altogether needlessly
deprived the state of power to resort to a popular and generally used form of
tax, and departed from a well nigh universal current of authority.
WnLs-CoNFLICr OF LAws-REOGNrITN OF FoREIGN PROBATE DEcREs.-The
testatrix, domiciled in New Jersey, executed a will in New York disposing of
realty and personalty situated in both states. Only five per cent of the property
was situated in New Jersey. The New York court, assuming jurisdiction under
authority of statute, denied probate on the ground of testamentary incapacity.
Subsequently the executor, the proponent in the New York suit, joined two
legatees and petitioned for probate in New Jersey. Held, that the New York
decree was conclusive. In Re Bariey's Will (1923, N. J. Prerog.) 12o Atl. 513.
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A proceeding to probate a will is said to be in the nature of an action in rein.
Woodruff v. Taylor (1847) 20 Vt. 65; Waples, Proceedings in Rein (1882) sec.
563. But the full faith and credit clause requires recognition of a judgment of
probate only in respect to the property in the foreign state concerned. See Broun
v. Fletcher (19o8) 210 U. S. 82, 28 Sup. Ct. 702; Robertson v. Pickrell (1883)
Iog U. S. 608, 3 Sup. Ct. 407; contra: Ines v. Salisbury (1884) 56 Vt. 565.
However, as a matter of comity, other states do give effect to a foreign probate
decree, but only if the court granting it had "jurisdiction over the res." Brock v.
Frank (1874) 51 Ala. 85. Hence the decision of a foreign court on the factum
of a will of realty is not, in the absence of statute, accepted at the situs. Clarke
.v. Clarke (igoo) 178 U. S. I86, 20 Sup. Ct. 873; Robertson v. Pickrell, supra;
Rice v. Jones (1786, Va.) 4 Call. 89. But as to wills of personalty, other
sovereigns, for the sake of convenience, recognize the probate judgments of the
decedent's last domicile. Higgins v. Eaton (1913, C. C. A. 2d) 2o2 Fed. 75. The
"res" over which the domicile is said to have "jurisdiction" is the fictitious
"stat us" of the estate. Martin v. Stovall (1899) 1O3 Tenn. 1, 9, 52 S. W. 296,
298. The courts of the domicile usually hold that the proving of a will at the
situs of a part of the property does not affect assets located at the domicile.
Walton v. Hall's Estate (1894) 66 Vt. 455, 29 Atl. 803; Stark v. Parker (1876)
56 N. H. 481; see In Re Gaines' Will (1895, Sup. Ct.) 84 Hun, 520, 32 N. Y.
Supp. 398, affirmed 154 N. Y. 747, 49 N. E. 1097; contra: In Re Estate of Spang
(1922, Pa. Orphans' Ct.) 68 N. Y. L. Joua. 705 (unusual theory that the res is the
will itself). However one who was a party to a foreign proceeding may be
concluded by it, even in a subsequent suit involving different property interests.
See Torrey v. Bruner (igo) 6o Fla. 365, 53 So. 337. But, contrary to the princi-
pal case, it has been held that the legatees are not in such privity with the executor
as to be concluded by a judgment against him in a proceeding of probate to which
they were not parties. Foley v. O'Donaghue (19o6) 167 Ind. 134, 77 N. E. 352.
See De Mora v. Concha (1884) L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 268, affirmed (1886, H. L.) L. R. ii
A. C. 541. Cf. Brigham v. Fayerweather (1886) 140 Mass. 411, 5 N. E. 265.
The policy of the instant case would be highly questionable on any other facts,
as it would compel the legatee to see that the will is not rejected in any state where
property is located, and so would be against the settled rule of convenience
allowing the domicile primary jurisdiction over wills of personalty.
